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Abstract. Immunologists use psychological and cognitive terms to 
describe and explain the behavior of our immune system. Do they 
use them metaphorically or literally? In this paper I show that on 
the grounds of some psychophysical assumptions, the uniqueness 
of each person (or self) as an individual organism necessarily 
corresponds to the singularity of each person as a psychological 
subject. On the basis of these assumptions, immunologists, 
irrespective of their various conceptual frames, are entitled to 
ascribe psychological and cognitive traits to our immune system 
and its behavior. Immunologists are allowed to do so because each 
immune system of any higher, unique individual organism 
corresponds to psychological traits, which are ascribable only to 
persons, each of whom is a singular being. This correspondence is 
necessarily compatible with the psychophysical unity or 
inseparability. Furthermore, the psychological or cognitive traits 
pertain to the immune system require no consciousness. In the case 
of artificial immune systems, in contrast, the application of 
psychological or cognitive terms is only metaphorical, for each 
such system is not unique but it is duplicable or replicable. Only 
the immune system of unique individual organisms that as 
psychological subjects are singular beings—i.e. persons—can be 
subject, literally or non-metaphorically, to psychological and 
cognitive terms. 
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The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that immunologists are allowed to 
use, literally or non-metaphorically, cognitive and psychological terms in 
describing, understanding, and explaining our immune system. 
 
1. My Psychophysical Assumptions 
Let us begin with some psychophysical assumptions (hereafter “my 
psychophysical assumptions”).1  
Each one of us is a person (self). As a psychological subject, each 
person is a singular being, namely, he or she is not similar to any other 
person; he or she is unlike any other person. Singularity is the 
distinguishing mark of subjectivity, personhood, and selfhood. There is 
something substantial about each person that makes him or her dissimilar 
to any other being. As a biological creature, on the other hand, each 
person (self) is unique, namely, such a creature is not identical to any 
other biological creature. For instance, as a psychological subject the 
person called James Joyce was a singular being. In a substantial sense 
                                                
1
 These assumptions are established, explained, and elaborated in a special 
possibilist metaphysical theory called “panenmentalism” (Gilead 1999, 2003, 2005, 
2009, 2010, 2011, 2013a, and 2013b). Yet, in this paper, they are discussed 
independently of this metaphysics, which may appear to leave them somewhat 
unsupported by extensive and detailed arguments. Nevertheless, these assumptions 
serve here as insights to throw some light on the justification of immunologists in 
using psychological and cognitive terms while describing and understanding our 
immune system. Thus, should the reader be persuaded that my psychophysical 
assumptions indeed throw such light, these assumptions would thus gain the required 
support to the extent that this essay is concerned. 
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there was no other person like James Joyce; whereas as a human being, as 
a higher organism, James Joyce was unique, namely there was no other 
human being identical to James Joyce. Hence, James Joyce’s brain, 
immune system, and fingerprints were unique; there was no other human 
being who could have had Joyce’s brain, immune system, or fingerprints. 
They pertained exclusively to him, yet they shared many properties with 
other similar organs, systems, or tissues of other human beings. Thus, the 
brain, immune system, and fingerprints of each human being share some 
common properties, some similarity with those of other human beings. 
Uniqueness implies irreplicability or unduplicability. Necessarily, 
there is no replica or duplicate of my fingerprints, immune system, or 
brain. My body as a whole is irreplicable or unduplicable. Even if two 
higher organisms, such as clones or “identical” twins, are supposed to 
share the same genes, these organisms are not identical or, at least, not 
strictly identical.    
Singularity is what distinguishes us as psychological subjects from 
any objects. Subjectivity, personhood, and selfhood, as psychological 
traits, pertain to the category of singularity. Only psychological subjects 
are singular, whereas some objects can be unique but never singular. 
Our psychological singularity has indications. Let me mention two 
of them. The first is the psychological anomalousness (nomos is “law” in 
ancient Greek, whereas “anomalous” means “being not subject to laws”): 
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our mind, unlike our body, is not subject to the laws of nature, namely, to 
the laws of physics, chemistry, biochemistry, and biology. There is no 
physics, chemistry, biochemistry, or biology of the mind. As for 
psychology, it provides us with nothing that can be considered as a law of 
nature. Any psychological subject is exempt from such laws. Even if 
human ways of behavior, attitudes, reactions, and the like show some 
similarity, order, and structures, still there is no nomic necessity whatever 
that any of the human subjects should behave or react according to the 
expectation or predication that such similarity, order, and structures 
would imply. Human creativity, for instance, is not subject to any 
psychological law, structure, paradigm, or order and, thus, it can be 
entirely unexpected or unpredictable. Neither is human creativity subject 
to any rule. Unlike the psychological, the physical, whether chemical, 
biochemical, or biological, or strictly physical, is necessarily subject to 
the laws of nature. No individual body—an organism, for instance—is 
exempt from these laws. The bodily or the physical, unlike the 
psychological, is inescapably nomic, namely subject to laws.  
The second indication of the psychological singularity is private 
accessibility. In principle, we have public access to any object, body, or 
organism. For instance, our brain is publically accessible directly or 
indirectly (by means of brain imaging technology), whereas there is no 
such access to our mind. Only I have access to my thoughts, feelings, and 
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emotions. If I do not report or “reveal” them to other persons, no other 
person except me has epistemic access to them. My mind constitutes an 
inner reality, to which no access from without is possible. As for the 
future, I see no serious reason to believe that brain imaging, for example, 
will allow us access to the mind of any person. Obviously, the way I 
experience, feel, or think about anything is singular, and nobody else can 
experience, feel, or think what is going on in my mind as I experience, 
feel, or think it. But private accessibility is much more than that, for it 
means that nobody else can have epistemic access to my mind. Even if 
my behavior, expressions, or reactions convey the impression to another 
person what my psychological state is, that person still has no epistemic 
access to my mind. Revealing my mind to others is simply a phrase, 
which does not indicate any possibility for epistemic access from without 
to my mind.  
Our ordinary experience provides us with many solid reasons to 
consider mind and body as distinct and yet as inseparable. Thus, we have 
many good reasons to maintain both psychophysical irreducibility 
(namely, the mind is irreducible to the body and vice versa) and 
psychophysical unity, which means that mind and body are inseparable 
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and that there is a full correspondence between them. In other words, 
psychophysical unity means that our body embodies our mind.2  
Maintaining both these two psychophysical assumptions means 
that our psychological singularity necessarily corresponds to our 
biological uniqueness and vice versa. The singularity of the mind is the 
uniqueness of the body, or the singularity of the mind is embodied as the 
uniqueness of the body. As singularity is ascribable only to psychological 
subjects, on the grounds of the psychophysical unity or inseparability, 
each person as an organism is unique, whereas, as a psychological 
subject, this person is singular. Psychological singularity, which is 
anomalous, and biological uniqueness, which is yet nomic (i.e. subject to 
laws), are inseparable or united. In every case in which an individual 
organism is unique, namely, unduplicable or irreplicable, psychological 
traits should be ascribed to it as an embodied psychological subject. The 
uniqueness of a person as an organism reflects his or her singularity as a 
psychological subject. Unique organisms are thus subject to 
psychological and cognitive traits or, in other words, mind necessarily 
pertains to such organisms to the extent that each one of them is 
induplicable or irreplicable.  
                                                
2
 Or, our mind is embodied in our body. In the possibilist terms which 
panenmentalism endorses, the body is the actuality of our mind, which, in turn, is a 
singular pure possibility. Hence, the mind is actualized in our body. See the appendix 
below. 
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Because of the psychophysical inseparability or unity, our private 
accessibility to our mind corresponds to a parallel state concerning our 
immune system—as we shall see below, the immune system of each one 
of us has a sort of private or individual accessibility, as it has access only 
to the body to which this system pertains.  
 Persons are systematic and coherent complexes of interconnected 
and interdependent heterogeneous parts, all sharing one and the same 
psychological reality, privately accessible. Hence, persons can be 
embodied only as higher, multicellular organisms of a special kind, 
capable of self-awareness and of relating to other persons, each of whom 
has a unique immune system.3 Each such organism is a unique, 
irreplicable biological individual. The biological individuality mentioned 
and discussed in this paper is thus only of persons or “selves” embodied 
as such organisms. I will return to this issue later below. 
 All the aforementioned psychophysical assumptions are 
undoubtedly subject to debates, criticisms, and questioning. My approach 
to the psychophysical problem is not only a new kind of possibilism, it 
                                                
3
 For a general definition of organism—“a functionally integrated living thing, 
highly organized, and made of interdependent parts”—see Pradeu 2013, p. 79. Pradeu 
“makes clear why taking immunity into account sheds light on the individuation of 
every multicellular organism” (ibid.). Although most of his paper focuses on the 
organism as a unified and cohesive multicellular individual, he devotes some of it to 
show how immunology can be useful also to better understand biological individuals 
other than multicellular organisms. I, however, do not apply the concept of personal 
individuality to every multicellular organism, let alone to other kinds of organism 
(whether unicellular or superorganisms, such as bees, ants, and termites), but only to 
those who are endowed with highly functional brains that embody self-awareness and 
the capability of relating to other persons as subjects.  
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also opposes externalism, naturalism, and physicalism (or materialism). 
As metaphysical, such controversies will not end, and each side has its 
strong supporters as well as its opponents. Recently, Saul Kripke, Frank 
Jackson, and David Chalmers, to mention only three, have suggested 
various very solid reasons and arguments against physicalism. Equally, 
there are some enlightening approaches subscribing to physicalism and 
suggesting counter-arguments. The same holds true for externalism (like 
physicalism, there are various kinds of externalism) which I also oppose 
and whose classical adherents were Quine and Donald Davidson. Of 
course, there are strong supporters of naturalism as well as no less strong 
opponents. The issue of psychological private accessibility is also 
controversial, and naturalist and externalists, such as Donald Davidson, 
have generally denied its plausibility (as did Wittgenstein in 
Philosophical Investigations). All the more, the problem of personal 
identity has been very much with us, beginning with David Hume and 
going on to Derek Parfit and many others (see Gilead 2008). Finally, 
psychological anomalousness is also philosophically controversial and 
yet, undoubtedly, it is perfectly compatible with the singularity of each 
person as a psychological subject.  
 I would take issue with any of these controversies, but this paper is 
not the proper place to defend my metaphysical view as challenging other 
views. Let me say only this: the reducibility of mind to body, which the 
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reductionist physicalism or materialism supports (is there any genuine 
physicalism that in fact does not support a reduction of the mind to the 
body?) is entirely incompatible with the widely acknowledged distinction 
between mind and body, of which all of us, whether physicalist-
materialist or otherwise, should be well aware. Reduction should be 
considered as unacceptable whenever its price is too high, and any 
psychophysical reduction ignores major psychophysical differences, 
varieties, and richness and renders our experience much shallower, 
poorer, and narrower than it really is. Such reductions inescapably lead to 
psychophysical poverty, which is susceptible to strong doubts and 
criticism. As for the psychophysical unity, dualists (to begin with 
Descartes), Spinoza, or any physicalist, mutatis mutandis, have 
acknowledged it. We are all well aware of the indisputable fact that there 
is a very strong connection between our mind and our body despite the 
differences between them. Finally, as for psychological private 
accessibility, despite the cliché “a penny for your thoughts,” we have no 
epistemic access to the mind of another person. If we believe otherwise, it 
is only because of a category mistake—the access that we really have is 
to the intersubjective (or, in case of intimacy, the interpersonal) 
implications or reflections of what occurs in the other person’s mind, 
whereas his or her mind per se, intrinsically, is beyond such access. Thus, 
the access we have to the intersubjective implications or reflections of 
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this or that mind is only relational and by no means intrinsic. What is 
going on in a mind reflects on our intersubjective reality to which we 
have an epistemic access as we, as psychological subjects, share this 
reality (it is “inter us”). As I have just said, externalists and naturalists do 
not accept the idea of private accessibility, but I know of no externalist or 
naturalist who can offer a penny or even much more for any of my 
thoughts unless I informed him or her about them (for extensive 
arguments to defend psychological private accessibility consider Gilead 
2003, pp. 43–75; Gilead 2008; Gilead 2011).  
    
2. Applying Psychological Terms to Immunology: Breznits’s 
Contribution 
 
It was only very recently (in June 2013), while reading the psychologist 
Shlomo Breznitz’s autobiography (Breznitz 2012, especially pp. 123–
132), that I have become acquainted with his inspiring paper, 
“Immunoalienation: A Behavioral Analysis of the Immune System” 
(Breznitz 2001).4 Having read this paper, it dawned on me that the 
aforementioned psychophysical assumptions may shed new light on some 
recent novelties in immunology. 
 Immunoalienation is the process in which the immune system 
deviates from its initial status. When the immune system recognizes 
                                                
4
 Which Breznitz considers as the most important work he has ever made, 
expecting yet for acknowledgement (Breznitz 2012, p. 132). 
Gilead - Immunology, Singularity, and Uniqueness  11
factors of the organism (“self-factors”) as alien, autoimmune reaction 
may occur. The main thesis of Breznitz’s paper is about the possible 
incongruence within the context of the warning immune system of two 
separate psychological concepts—objective threat, signifying real danger, 
and threat “as defined by the appraiser” which, in this case, is the immune 
system (Breznitz 2001, p. 88). Having read Breznitz’s paper, I have 
turned to some more recent developments in immunology. In this paper, I 
would like to show that the fascinating ideas that Breznitz and some 
immunologists share can be nicely interpreted in the terms of my 
psychophysical assumptions. In other words, his paper suggests a novel 
example in which our immune system, which is a biological entity, is also 
subject to psychological traits, in addition to chemical and biological 
properties. Though a great deal of the immune system is subject to 
physical, chemical, biochemical, or biological properties, it is still equally 
subject to psychological traits as they are embodied in that system. No 
wonder that psychological states strongly, sometimes even quite 
dramatically, reflect on our immunity and the behavior of our immune 
system. 
One of the bold ideas in Breznitz’s paper is that no error or mistake 
is involved in using psychological terms in immunology, for the 
psychological mechanism of false alarm (“Cry wolf”) describes precisely 
and explains an undeniable immunological phenomenon. In fact, Breznitz 
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demonstrates how psychological mechanism is biologically or 
immunologically applied, i.e. embodied. In the terms of my 
psychophysical assumptions, an immunological mechanism, in this case, 
implements, embodies, a psychological trait or state of a special kind of 
reaction to threats. Below, I will say more about Breznitz’s contribution. 
 The terms “self,” “nonself,” or “protected and unprotected self” 
frequently appear in Breznitz’s paper. The use of such terms in 
immunology raises some philosophical and scientific problems. For 
instance, even though Anne-Marie Moulin and Alfred I. Tauber consider 
these terms as metaphors, they did not ignore their indispensability and 
fruitfulness for immunology (Tauber 1997). Thomas Pradeu points out 
the ineradicable alleged imprecision involved in these terms while 
applied to immunology. Such imprecision, he believes, is intolerable 
insofar as the exact sciences are concerned (Pradeu 2012, p. 129). 
Moreover, he believes that “the self-nonself theory did not allow for the 
full understanding of modern immunology’s experimental data” (ibid., p. 
130). 
3. Matzinger’s Danger Model and Its Contribution to the Self-
Nonself Controversy; More of the Applicability of Cognitive and 
Psychological Terms to Immunology and Its Critics  
 
Indeed, one of the celebrated immunologists of our time has proposed to 
relinquish the self-nonself terminology in immunology. The abstract of 
her pioneering article states: 
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For many years immunologists have been well served by the 
viewpoint that the immune system’s primary goal is to discriminate 
between self and non-self. I believe that it is time to change 
viewpoints and, in this essay, I discuss the possibility that the 
immune system does not care about self and non-self, that its 
primary driving force is the need to detect and protect against 
danger, and that it does not do the job alone, but receives positive 
and negative communications from an extended network of other 
bodily tissues. (Matzinger 1994, p. 991)5  
 
 
Pradeu, albeit rejecting the self-nonself theory and claiming that it is not 
the antigen’s “foreignness” (which I associate with Brezntiz’s 
immunoalienation) that causes the immune response, argues that 
Matzinger’s immunological theory is inadequate, too, as the term 
“danger” is  
anthropomorphic at its core, which is problematic for a theory that 
aims specifically to criticize this very aspect of the self-nonself 
theory. How could immune cells perceive “danger” as such…? The 
“danger” is likely to be a projection on the immune system of the 
immunologist’s perception. (Pradeu 2012, p. 208)6  
                                                
5
 Cf. Matzinger 2002a; Matzinger 2007; Matzinger 2011; and Matzinger 2012. 
Yet, note that Matzinger does not entirely dispense with the term “self,” which has a 
definite meaning in her view: “In the discussion of T cell tolerance that follows, I call 
‘self’ any part of the body, and ‘non-self’ any part of the rest of the universe” 
(Matzinger 1994, p. 995). Consider also the reaction of Janeway and others to her 
model: “self-nonself discrimination is alive and well” (Janeway et al. 1996, p. 519). 
As Janeway suggests, innate immunity discriminates between infectious nonself and 
noninfectious self (Janeway 2001). For an earlier critique of Matzinger’s model see 
Vance 2000. Vance argues that “self-nonself discrimination continues to be a ‘useful 
heuristic device’ that helps explain diverse immunological phenomena” (Vance 2000, 
p. 1726). Furthermore, he claims, while the danger theorists, such as Matzinger and 
Ephraim J. Fuchs, might avoid the word “self,” the case appears to be that they 
“cannot and do not actually discard the concept of ‘the self’” (ibid.). Hence, he 
ventures, “danger theorists might secretly agree that self-nonself discrimination does 
occur on some level” (ibid.). 
6
 Vance suggests that what holds true for the self-nonself model holds equally 
for the danger model, for “the notion of danger curiously fails to live up to the same 
three criteria used in rejecting the concept of ‘self,’ namely 1) it isn’t well defined, 2) 
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Similarly, Tauber warns the reader of the category errors involved in the 
elusive term of the “immune self.” These errors mistake the biological for 
the psychological or the philosophical, as “self” is a psychological or 
philosophical term, not a biological one (Tauber 1999).7  
Tauber acknowledges that in the autoimmune reaction it is the self 
that “has been violated” (Tauber 1997, p. 228), but, he writes, such cases 
are exceptional and do not reflect the usual states of the immune systems. 
Breznitz does not limit his use of the self-nonself terms to such cases, and 
it is interesting to realize that, while mentioning the term “unprotected 
self,” Breznitz refers to the fact that the immune system recognizes some 
self elements as alien, which leads to autoimmune reactions (Breznitz 
2001, p. 93).  
The immunologist Irun Cohen sees no problem in applying the 
term “recognition” to unconscious entities, as long as discrimination and 
response are involved in the recognition in discussion (Cohen 2000, pp. 
                                                                                                                                       
it has many exceptions, and 3) it doesn’t account for a wide enough range of 
immunological phenomena” (ibid). Note that “in some cases the immune system may 
be tuned neither to danger nor strangers. … The moral is that if the diversity of 
immune detectors is to be appreciated, it becomes necessary to speak not of a single 
‘danger’ signal, but of multiple ‘danger + stranger + other’ signals. But if we’re going 
to appreciate the plurality of immunogenic signals, why not discuss the signals 
directly, and dispense with the monolithic and misleading label of ‘danger’? ” (ibid., 
p. 1727). On these grounds, Vance and others “have tried to suggest that, because of 
its explanatory power, immunologists are right to retain the generalization of ‘self-
nonself,’ despite its flaws” (ibid.). 
7
 For a contrary view, defending the use of philosophical-psychological 
terminology of self-nonself and intentionality in immunology, consult Howes 1998. 
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125–126).  Tauber and Pradeu would probably argue that “recognition” is 
a psychological term, not a biological or immunological one, which 
renders such a use of it as a mistake or error. Nevertheless, on the 
grounds of my psychophysical assumptions, their views may turn out to 
be considered as wrong, while that of Breznitz (as well as of many 
immunologists at present, for instance, Irun Cohen and Polly Matzinger,8 
and previously Frank Macfarlane Burnet, who applied the terms “self” 
and “non-self” to immunology) can be well explained and justified, 
notwithstanding the major differences between their immunologist views. 
Contrary to Matzinger (though without any reference to her), Breznitz 
suggests “instead of real danger a ‘real self’ must be defined; and instead 
of analyzing perceived danger, ‘self as defined by the immune system’ 
ought to be analyzed” (Breznitz 2001, p. 98).9 The case appears to be that 
such a view is controversial in the immunologists’ community today, yet 
it can be still defended on quite another basis, as both the self-nonself 
model and the danger model may synergize to determine the quality and 
                                                
8
 For the function of recognition in the immune system see Cohen 1992a, p. 
442; Cohen 1992b, p. 492; and Matzinger 2007, p. 11. However, Cohen objects to the 
view that “the immune system deals only with protecting the body against invasion, 
against the foreign, against danger” (Cohen 2000, p. 192). As he sees it, the immune 
system, like the brain, is not a transformational, linear, and sequential system; it is 
rather reactive, on-going, non-linear, and in constant dialogue with its environment 
and with itself (ibid.). It not only protects the body; it also keeps maintaining it 
incessantly. Cf. Pradeu 2013. 
9
 Cf. “The immune system has a somewhat paranoic bias, that is, everything is 
a threat. Everything, that is, with the exception of self” (Breznitz 2001, p. 88), which 
Matzinger would reject entirely. 
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extent of the innate immune responses (Martinon et al. 2009, p. 239 based 
upon Rock et al. 2005). Indeed, advocating a newer pattern-recognition 
receptor model, which refers to the potential threat as “very foreign” 
(Matzinger 2007, p. 11), Matzinger in fact integrates her danger model 
with the idea of foreignness (or, in Breznitz’s term, immunoalienation). 
In this spirit, she ends her paper with these words:  
 
As we expand our picture of the immune system from an army of 
lymphocytes patrolling the body for foreigners to an integrated 
group of communicating tissues, all working to maintain tissue 
integrity and health, we will necessarily need to include the signals 
from the non-self organisms that take advantage of that health or 
that help maintain it. (Matzinger 2007, p. 13)10 
 
 In these words, Matzinger returns the self-nonself distinction to the realm 
of update immunology. First of all, the problem lies on the conceptual 
basis which in turn relies, inter alia, on some psychophysical grounds or 
assumptions. Moreover, we should attempt as much as possible to save 
possibilities, and if the synergy of two immunological models, the self-
                                                
10
 Cf. Matzinger 2011 and Matzinger 2012. As Alfred Tauber rightly puts it, 
Matzinger “formulated the immune system as interlocked with every compartment of 
the body, and thereby regulated in response to ‘danger’ signals that might arise from 
any tissue subject to injury or insult. The ‘meaning’ of immunogenicity, that is, 
reactivity, in this format is situated within a larger functional framework, for example 
the sense of ‘danger’ ensuing from inflammation” (Tauber 2008, p. 234). 
Nevertheless, in the spirit of my ideas in this paper, danger and meaning should not be 
considered as metaphors but as literal concepts concerning our immune system and 
our organism as a whole.  Macfarlane Burnet, who coined the term “the immune self,” 
was the first (already in 1949) to adopt parallels with the psychological self (Tauber 
2008, p. 225). Furthermore, immunology becomes part of psycho-neuroimmunology, 
“which defines immunity as a cognitive activity coordinated with other cognitive 
systems” (Tauber 2008, p. 235; referring to Ader et al. 2001). 
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nonself and the danger model, is proved to be adequate to understand and 
explain immunological reactions, we should prefer such a synergy also on 
this basis. I see no real conflict between the two models to the extent that 
Breznitz’s innovation is concerned. On the contrary, they both really help 
to establish the idea that some biological processes are, in fact, subject to 
some psychological traits or states. 
 As early as 1974, Niels K. Jerne applied cognitive terms, such as 
recognition, learning, and memory, to the immune system (Jerne 1974), 
which he found analogous to the central nervous system.11 Furthermore, 
his Nobel lecture in physiology or medicine of 1984, referring to Noam 
Chomsky’s generative grammar, made an analogy between linguistics 
and immunology, between the description of language and that of the 
immune system (Jerne 1984a). Jerne says: “I find it astonishing that the 
immune system embodies a degree of complexity which suggests some 
more or less superficial though striking analogies with human language 
and that this cognitive system has evolved and functions without 
assistance of the brain” (Jerne 1984a, p. 223; italics added). To ascribe 
cognitive functions to the brain is undoubtedly justified, but what allows 
us to ascribe such functions to the immune system? In what follows I will 
                                                
11
 Jerne’s immunology endorsed the view that “the immune system (like the 
brain) reflects first ourselves, then produces a reflection of this reflection, and … 
subsequently it reflects the outside world … The mirror images of the outside world, 
however, do not have permanency in the genome. Every individual must start with 
self” (Jerne 1984b, pp. 19–20). 
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show, on the grounds of my psychophysical assumptions, why we are 
allowed to apply cognitive and psychological terms to our immune 
system. In showing this, I will return below to Matzinger’s contribution.  
 
4. A Comment on the “Cognition” and “Individuation” of Bacteria, 
Social Amoeba, and Social Insects 
 
Pamela Lyon’s biogenic approach, “asking psychological questions as if 
they were biological questions” (Lyon 2006), is a tantalizing view 
according to which cognitive capability should be ascribed even to 
bacteria: “A bacterium may not remember much for long, but it must 
remember, if only for a few seconds—which may be, relatively speaking, 
a long time for a microbe” (ibid., which shows the author’s pretty sense 
of humor).12 Despite my appreciation and the significant merits of Lyon’s 
biogenic approach, I do not subscribe to this approach but prefer quite a 
different one instead, considering individuality, uniqueness, and 
singularity and especially concerning the individuating function of the 
immune system. Against the background of the current paper and the 
aforementioned psychophysical assumptions, I would not ascribe 
cognition, let alone psychological traits, to bacteria unless in a highly 
metaphorical sense. Undoubtedly, at least to the extent that scientific 
                                                
12
 Cf: “recent developments in microbiology undermine standard arguments 
against bacterial cognition and a closer look at bacterial behavior would reward 
cognitive scientists” (Lyon 2007, p. 823). 
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approaches are concerned, the case appears that we are not allowed to 
attribute phenomenal qualities (qualia), even in a highly metaphorical 
sense, to bacteria. As for knowledge and intentions, to ascribe them to 
bacteria appears to me quite farfetched, as the events in which bacteria 
are involved should not be considered, under philosophical scrutiny, as 
actions. Why, according to Lyon’s approach, do the reactions of an 
organism to its environment result in constituting the organism’s 
“cognitive reality”? It is because Lyon defines knowing as “effective 
action.” I can quite easily imagine an effective event, process, change, or 
even “behavior” (such as atomic, molecular, or mechanical “behavior”) 
which should not be called “action” (unless by question begging) and 
which is involved with no knowledge or cognition at all. What adapts 
lower or simpler organisms to their environment would not be knowledge 
at all. Why should we subject evolutional changes of such organisms to 
“cognition” or “knowledge”? At least to the extent that these organisms 
are concerned, evolution implies events or processes, not actions. In 
general, the survival of the fittest does not necessarily depend on 
whatsoever action, cognition, knowledge, or intention of the creatures 
involved. I do not see how a theory of action can be applied to the 
evolution of simple organisms such as bacteria. 
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 As for similar interesting contributions,13 they should be discussed 
in a similar vein. Unlike bacteria, “social amoeba,” bees, or ants, each 
higher organism, even those socialized in herds, has an individuality of its 
own. I understand the concept “higher organism” to apply only to 
organisms that are substantial individuals, each of which has a unique 
immune system of its own. We should not consider the herd as an 
individual unified organism. In contrast, we may consider colonies of 
bacteria or those of ants, bees, and other social insects as individual 
unified organisms. Each of such colonies may be analogous to a 
multicellular individual. We may compare each ant or bee to a cell in a 
higher organism but we should ascribe non-metaphorical cognitive and 
psychological terms only to individuals which (or who) are higher 
organisms embodying cognitive and psychological traits. We should, of 
course, not ignore ecology, and we should treat our body as an individual 
ecological system (a conception which rendered possible the first 
successful kidney transplantation in humans, as Jean Hamburger reported 
about it). It is clear that in the ecological system of our body bacteria 
have a role in our immunity (see, for instance, Costello et al. 2012). 
Nevertheless, none of this diminishes even slightly the substantial 
                                                
13
 Such as Chen et al. 2007, Ugelvig and Cremer 2007, and Marraffini and 
Sontheimer 2010 (assuming a discrimination between “self” and “nonself” on p. 186). 
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individuality and relative separation of any higher organism and its 
immune system. 
 
5. Irun Cohen’s Novel Cognitive Paradigm for Immunology 
Challenging the incompleteness of Burnet’s clonal selection paradigm, 
Irun Cohen suggests a fascinating idea, especially from the perspective of 
my psychophysical assumptions. Cohen suggests a “cognitive paradigm” 
for immunology (Cohen 1992a), according to which the “immune system 
must know to focus on particular antigens and how to evaluate their 
context before it actually encounter the antigens” (ibid., p. 444; italics 
added).14 Cohen defines cognitive paradigms as “founded on the idea that 
any system which collects and processes information will do its job most 
efficiently by having an internal representation of its subject. … in a 
sense, a cognitive system is a one that knows what it should be looking 
for … their internal organization endows them with a kind of 
intentionality” (Cohen 1992a, p. 443; italics added). Even though “the 
intentions … are ours, not nature’s” (Cohen 2000, p. 50) and the 
cognition in discussion does not involve consciousness (ibid., p. 92), the 
intentionality he ascribed to the immune system is not metaphorical; it 
                                                
14
 Or, “the healthy immune system usually can be fooled only once. …The 
system can learn to interpret context” (Cohen 1992b, p. 491; italics added). 
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simply does not reflect any consciousness or teleological assumption 
(ibid.).  
Cognitive systems differ strategically from other systems in the 
following capabilities: (1) exercising options, namely, making choices or 
decisions (given that there are also unconscious decisions15); (2) 
containing within them internal images of the environment; and (3) self-
organizing—using experience to build and update their internal structures 
and images (Cohen 2000, p. 64). Some of these images are abstract as 
they are not made of matter but created by processes (ibid., pp. 174–175; 
for instance the doctor, checking the patient’s white blood cell count, 
consciously diagnoses an infection; similarly, the immune system 
unconsciously diagnoses or recognizes the state of some tissue as 
infected).  Furthermore, the abovementioned capabilities “in concert 
make it possible for cognitive creatures to interact with the world in a 
way that supersedes the confines of evolutionary genetics. Cognition will 
turn out to be a form of meta-genetic adaptation. Cognition, as it 
proceeds, creates individuality” (ibid; italics added).16 As we will see, on 
                                                
15
 Cohen 2000, p. 68. Moreover, these decisions are associated with a will: 
“instead of passively receiving what the environment imposes, the cognitive system 
exerts its will … in choosing among alternatives. … cognitive systems are more 
resourceful: not only do they choose, they seek” (Cohen 2000, p. 69; italics added). 
Nevertheless, the choice under discussion is deterministic and “is not dependent on 
any self-reflective consciousness or mystically free will” (Cohen 2000, p. 182). 
16
 Cf.: “Cognition enriches the diversity of existence. … Cognitive creature, in 
contrast to non-cognitive creatures [such as bacteria or trees], learn individually and 
diversify as individuals, and not only as species” (Cohen 2000, p. 93). 
Gilead - Immunology, Singularity, and Uniqueness  23
the grounds of my psychophysical assumptions, individuality plays a 
crucial role in subjecting the immune system to cognitive and 
psychological traits. 
Cohen shows in detail “how antigen selection operates through 
internal images of infection and of the self (the immunological 
homunculus). These images in part are encoded in the germ-line, refined 
in the thymus and primed by mother” (Cohen 1992a, p. 444).17 Cohen 
mentions a threefold set of primary internal images, which constitute “a 
reference point that define the intentionality of the immune system: which 
antigens it should seek out and remember” (Cohen 1992b, p. 492; italics 
added), or “the germ-line elements … the B cells, and the T cells each 
analyze different features of the antigenic entity and extract the special 
information they intend to see …” (ibid; italics added).18 He also 
mentions “apparatus of processing and presentation” (Cohen 1992b, p. 
494; italics added) and “internal images” allowing “the system to encode 
                                                
17
 Of course, the immunological homunculus is not some “little man” sitting 
outside of the immune system and “rules” it; the homunculus is, instead, “the 
characteristic organization of autoimmunity itself” (Cohen 1992b, p. 493) or “a 
shorthand designation for the images of the body that self-organize in … the immune 
system” (Cohen 2000, p. 205). 
18
 Though the information mentioned is not in a strictly psychological sense 
but rather the one used in Claude Shannon’s information theory, consider, yet, the 
following analogy: “the eyes, organs designed for receiving information, also serve as 
organs designed for transmitting information [in the cognitive and psychological 
sense]. … there is a principle of biological signaling here, … it working at the 
molecular level in the immune system” (Cohen 2000, p. 77). And a little bit later, 
discussing information, Cohen writes: “Meaning is what information does. Indeed, the 
combination of information [now in a strictly psychological sense] with affect, which 
generates meaning, gives rise to behavior that feeds back to influence by cognitive 
creature’s world” (ibid., p. 78). 
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the essential fragments of the antigenic world to the system specifications 
and utility” (ibid.). Thus, “contrary to the expectation of clonal selection, 
the germ-line effectively encodes a primitive internal image of bacteria, 
viruses, and the context of inflammation” (Cohen 1992b, p. 490). In 
addition to the term “internal image,” Cohen refers to “primitive 
information arms cells with the capacity to recognize and respond to 
invaders” (ibid.; italics added). The daring idea of an immunological 
homunculus is about “an internal image of the self acquired by early 
recognition of self antigens, both in the thymus and in the periphery” 
(1992b, p. 492). It is the immune system’s representation of the body. 
Similar to the neurological homunculus, the immunological homunculus 
contains a “picture of the individual own body” (Cohen 1992a, p. 443). 
With Cohen, “the individuality of the mind arrives with the individuality 
of the brain” (Cohen 2000, p. 4), the immune system “defines the 
material components that make up the self,” it is the “guardian of our 
chemical individuality,” and it “establishes the molecular borders of each 
person” (ibid., p. 5). Note that Cohen’s use of the attribute cognitive does 
not imply consciousness and the term “intentionality” in his works is 
devoid of personality (Cohen 1992a, p.443), yet it is certainly about 
individuality and uniqueness. Moreover, the affinity of Cohen’s cognitive 
approach to the immune system and of his approach to the brain is closer 
to the way in which Gerald Edelman describes the central nervous system 
Gilead - Immunology, Singularity, and Uniqueness  25
(Cohen 2000, p. 189).19 This affinity, too, supports the application of 
psychological or cognitive terms to the immune system. 
 Uri Hershberg, one of the disciples and followers of Irun Cohen, 
claims in an interview with a philosophical journal that the line between 
biological systems and cognitive systems is a fake one, as there is no 
categorical difference between these two kinds of systems; the difference 
is, instead, of a “mental extension” (Hershberg 2012, p. 29). Thus,  
 
“Even a single cell that needs to act in the world does not do it like 
a machine. It acts with signals, with meanings. I am not saying that 
cells have abstract thoughts the way we do. They do not have high 
cognitive potential. But the way we manage to manipulate those is 
that we have senses. Even a single cell organism does not really 
have sensors. They have senses. (Hershberg, ibid.) 
 
   
As for the term “self,” Hershberg admits that it is “a philosophical 
concept that stands on individuality and what individuality means or how 
important it is” (ibid., p. 28). Yet, he states, without such a concept 
immunology cannot do their work, unless immunologists lie to 
themselves (following ibid, p. 36). The understanding of the immune 
system implies understanding of biological individuality20 or uniqueness. 
                                                
19
 For a panenmentalist critique of the emergentist psychophysical view of the 
mind in general and of that of Edelman in particular, consult Gilead 1999, pp. 12, 143, 
144, and 161. Cohen, too, is a Darwinian emergentist. Yet, the divergences in 
psychophysical views should not hinder us from accepting much of Cohen’s cognitive 
conception of the immune system.  
20
 Which is a separate important issue in the current philosophy of biology. I 
do not discuss this issue in the present paper. I refer to the biological individuality, as 
a multicellular organism’s individuality, only to the extent that the immune system is 
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Moreover, as the current paper attempts to show, a philosophical view is 
essential for immunology. 
I consider Cohen’s cognitive paradigm for immunology as most 
interesting from the perspective of my psychophysical assumptions, first 
of all for its use of psychological or cognitive terms literally and not 
metaphorically. What makes it even more attractive for our analysis is its 
aim to explain how the immune system “maintains and protects the 
individual” (Cohen 2000, p. xix). As I have mentioned above, Cohen’s 
conceptual framework “deals with the way the immune system relates to 
the individual body and defines its individuality” (ibid.; cf. p. 244–245: 
“tale of cognitive individuality” and “the story of the self”). In the terms 
of my psychophysical assumptions, the immune system in Cohen’s 
cognitive view relates to the unique identity of each human body which, 
in these terms, embodies the singularity of a person (at least as far as 
human beings are concerned). As Cohen’s analysis shows, following the 
sublime Talmudic idea that “Adam was created as a singularity,” “each 
individual fashions a unique world out of his or her unique somatic 
experience. Therefore, no individual is redundant, ever” (ibid., p. 244). 
Cohen’s analysis has “added the cognitive immune system to the armor 
of individuality. … The tale of Adam, like the message of this book, is a 
                                                                                                                                       
concerned. Note that Pradeu convincingly demonstrates that the immune system plays 
a crucial role in the emergence and maintenance of individuality and, thus, in defining 
biological individuality (Pradeu 2013). 
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tale of cognitive individuality” (ibid.). This is beautifully compatible with 
our independent view of singularity (especially in Gilead 2003 and, to 
begin with, Gilead 1999).  
Contrary to Tauber and others, Breznitz, Cohen, Matzinger, and 
other immunologists21 use the abovementioned indispensible cognitive 
and psychological terms in a literal sense. In the terms of my 
psychophysical assumptions, they recognize, in fact though sometimes 
unknowingly to this or that extent, that our immune system embodies or 
implements unconscious psychological traits.  
 Cohen ends his sequel paper thus: “The cognitive paradigm is an 
immunologist’s paradigm of the immune system’s paradigm of the 
molecular world” (Cohen 1992b, p. 494), which means that his paradigm 
represents the paradigm according to which the immune system consists. 
Thus, Cohen commits his paradigm to, at least some, correspondence 
with the immune reality, which means that in fact he considers this 
paradigm as not only useful but also as true. My view explains this better, 
I believe, for Cohen does not show what makes the immune reality to 
correspond to his or other’s paradigm. Speaking about usefulness, 
Cohen’s view can be considered as compatible with Tauber’s view about 
“self” and “nonself” as useful metaphors, whereas Cohen, in fact, 
                                                
21
 Cohen mentions that F. J. Varela, Antonio Coutinho, and others, too, “have 
called attention to the cognitive properties of recognition, learning, and memory as 
fundamental to immune behavior” (Cohen 1992a, p. 444). 
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suggests much more than that. On the basis of my psychophysical 
assumptions, he would be entirely allowed to use psychological or 
cognitive terms literally in analyzing the immune system. Furthermore, 
Cohen has taught us brilliantly that borrowing ideas and insights from art 
can contribute to immunology (Cohen 1994). 
 
6. Tauber’s Criticism of Cohen and of Other Immunological 
Cognitivists 
 
Tauber refers to Cohen’s immunological homunculus and to what he calls 
Cohen’s “cognitive metaphor” (Tauber 1997, pp. 178–182). Tauber 
ascribes the theories of both Matzinger and Cohen to the “contextualist 
scheme” (Tauber 1998). According to Tauber, Cohen made a critical 
theoretical turn regarding the entire notion of selfhood (ibid., p. 466). As I 
see it, Tauber’s recent challenge of the immune self or individuality 
(Tauber 2012), concerning especially the symbionts hosted in our body 
and which take part in the immune system, does not affect Cohen’s idea 
of the immunological homunculus in particular and the immune self in 
general. Given the fact, which Tauber 2012 mentions, that the immune 
system does not function properly if the symbiotic microbes are not 
residing, for instance, within the gut, why should the immune self or 
homunculus not mobilize such organisms for the sake of the body’s 
maintenance and immunity? The hologenome theory of evolution, to 
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which Tauber 2012 refers, is possibly adequate for understanding the 
evolution of coral reefs, for instance, but not necessarily for that of 
human beings. This may not affect at all the understanding of the human 
individual organism (or even of the higher vertebrates) as the object of 
natural selection and of immunology as well. Is the hologenome theory of 
the evolution of the immune system valid for higher vertebrates in 
general and for human beings in particular? No human being is simply a 
“society of cells.” Rather, each human being is a singular individual, a 
self. Contrary to Tauber, I attempt to demonstrate that self, recognition, 
memory, and learning, as correctly applied to the immune system, are not 
metaphors at all. Note that Tauber 2012, contrary to Cohen, entirely 
ignores the unconscious nature of these terms when applied to the 
immune system. 
 In 2013, Tauber suggests replacing the representational cognitivist 
approaches to immunology with “ecological” approaches. Tauber states:  
While a representational model has dominated immune theorizing, 
recent research supports the utility of an “ecological” orientation, 
which reflects the growing interests in systems biology, where the 
organism becomes a “node” in an ecological network (Tauber 
2012). This approach explores integration of functions (e.g., 
development, metabolism, immunity) and thereby emphasizes 
inter-connections, regulative dynamics, and organizational 
structures of holistic constructs, where individuals become 
subsumed to relationships of various kinds. (Tauber 2013, p. 241) 
 
In a clear contrast, Cohen, Breznitz, and my philosophical approach 
consider the individual, especially the human individual, by no means as 
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a “node” in an ecological network, which may be more suitable for 
bacteria, ants, and the like but not for higher organisms, especially human 
beings. Such individuals are not “subsumed to relationships of various 
kinds” but, on the contrary—the relationships are subsumed to the 
individuals. What comes first is the immune system of the individual—
not the external ecological system. Human society, per se, has no immune 
system; each individual owns it, and the first function of this system is to 
ensure the existence of the individual organism and to maintain its 
integrity and health. Actions and agency come later; they are secondary. 
First the system has to perceive and to learn, and only then to act or to 
decide to remain passive and not to react. Tauber replaces identity by 
agency, representation and learning—by action, whereas the case appears 
to be otherwise—our immune system aims primarily at individual being 
and existence and only secondly at agency. The individuating function of 
our immune system should not be ignored. 
Tauber complains that “notions of selfhood still undergird various 
contextual theories …., where a “homunculus” (Cohen 1992b) or even a 
Bumetian-inspired concept of selfhood  …  obscures Jerne’s crucial 
insight that the self-other distinction as a metaphorical extension of 
human personal identity distorts the character of immune perception” 
(Tuaber 2013, p. 249, n 9). Again, immunological cognitivists such as 
Irun Cohen and Shlomo Breznitz make a legitimate literal use of 
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psychological and cognitive terms in describing and analyzing our 
immune system. Moreover, I have not found even a shred of evidence 
that Cohen relies upon the problematic, even mistaken, analogue of the 
homunculus in the “Cartesian Theater.” On the contrary, the homunculus 
that Cohen mentions reflects a fruitful neurological concept, to which the 
immunological homunculus is similar (Cohen 1992a, p. 443),22 rather 
than anything of the “Cartesian homunculus.” Such cognitivism does not 
pertain at all to the “philosophical infrastructure” that guides Cohen and 
other immunological cognitivists. Cohen never confused the immune 
system with the scientist as a person. Unlike us, the immune system, as a 
cognitive system, observes, perceives, reflects, considers, chooses, and 
decides about anything only unconsciously. This makes a major 
difference between scientists and the cognitive system as an agency of a 
self, protecting it and maintaining its integrity and health. Hence, the 
following criticism by Tauber has no solid ground:  
If immune selfhood reflects an underlying conception of a 
homunculus discerning itself from the other through a cognitive 
faculty (e.g., Cohen 1992b; 2004), then the same issues confronting 
current representational philosophies of mind lie latent in 
contemporary immune theory. Discerning those issues raises a new 
dimension in the critique of the immune self. Simply, with the 
invocation of agency, the weakness of the “Cartesian Theater” in 
the immune setting is apparent: The immune system does not 
                                                
22
  Both the neurological homunculus and the analogue “immunological 
homunculus” have recently proven to be quite fruitful (see, for instance, Poletaev 
2003, 2008, 2012a, and 2012b; Gonzales and Lange 2007; and Zingrone 2010). 
Following Irun Cohen, Alexander Poletaev coined the term “Immunculus,” which is 
also the name of the scientific institute in Moscow which Poletaev heads. 
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reflect; it perceives without the interposition of an agent reviewing 
its findings. The scientist observes and constructs the self and its 
cognition. The phenomenon and the judgment of that phenomenon 
have distinctive epistemological characteristics that must be 
maintained. Simply, a sympathetic fallacy is committed when the 
immune system becomes an immune self.  (Tauber 2013, p. 259) 
 
In the next section, I will further discuss Cohen’s contribution as well as 
those of Breznitz and Matzinger. 
 
7. The Application of My Psychophysical Assumptions to 
Immunology 
 
The case appears to be that the self-nonself model is not sufficient for 
understanding and explaining many of the immune phenomena, which are 
explained by the danger model in its evolution. Nevertheless, we must not 
decide between the models. As the immune system is so comprehensive 
and diverse, it is possible that no model can exhaust it (see, for instance, 
Vance 2000, pp. 1727–1728).23 In any event, this does not mean that self-
nonself factors should not be taken into consideration, either. To the 
extent that Breznitz’s novel idea concerning danger and the “Cry wolf” 
phenomenon is concerned, the danger model is even more fruitful and 
compatible with the relevant immunological phenomena than the self-
nonself model alone. Whichever model one may choose, we still have to 
                                                
23
 Thus, Vance’s concluding suggestion is quite reasonable:  “Why not, rather, 
think of the immune system as a much more diverse collection of mechanisms and 
processes that have been cobbled together during the course of evolution? If I am 
right, it will be the details of these mechanisms and their interactions that will 
ultimately be of interest to immunologists, and not whether they conform to one 
‘paradigm’ or another” (Vance 2000,  p. 1728). 
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apply terms such as “danger,” “foreignness” (or “alienation”), and “self” 
to the immune system, literally and not in their metaphorical sense. I will 
now try to establish this literal application on the basis of my 
psychophysical assumptions.  
 From this viewpoint, our body, as a biological entity, embodies our 
mind, which is a psychological, singular being. The singularity of each 
mind is the singularity of a person, a psychological subject. According to 
my psychophysical assumptions, we ascribe singularity only to 
psychological subjects, whereas as organisms, which are subject to the 
laws of physics, chemistry, and biology, they share some similarities. The 
singularity of each one of them corresponds to the biological uniqueness 
of each.24 Thus, my genetic signature, my genetic self, is unique as are 
my finger prints and my immunological system. It is a received view that 
selfhood is a psychological matter, not simply a physical or biological 
one, whereas uniqueness is a biological trait of higher vertebrates or 
mammals. Thus, the question of “alienation” or “foreignness” is crucial 
when it comes to the biology of higher vertebrates, especially human 
beings. As our immunological system reflects the uniqueness of each one 
of us as a biological creature, as a human being, we are allowed to use the 
precise language of “foreignness” and “alienation,” and “self-nonself.” 
                                                
24
 Biological uniqueness is one of the major issues with which Pradeu 2012, 
too, deals with, raising the question, “What makes a living thing different from all 
other living things, including those that belong to the same species?” (Pradeu 2012, p. 
2). 
Gilead - Immunology, Singularity, and Uniqueness  34
There is a strong, necessary, or inseparable connection between our mind 
and our body and, as a matter of fact, this connection is the 
psychophysical unity. This unity should be distinguished from identity, as 
mind and body are not identical or reducible one to the other, although 
their unity is inseparable. There is, thus, an inseparability of personhood 
or singularity and biological uniqueness. The immune system of a higher 
organism guards it against what endangers or threatens its uniqueness. 
Because the immune system, as part and parcel of our body, implements 
or embodies some psychological traits as biological actualities, we are 
allowed, contrary to Tauber, Pradeu, and others, to attribute memory,25 
recognition, person-nonperson, meaning,26 and other psychological traits 
                                                
25
 Cf.: “‘Memory,’ whether in the form of differentiated B cells or sensitized T 
lymphocytes, is an essential component of the immune reaction. … This ‘positive 
recency effect’ (to borrow an expression from the psychology of learning) introduces 
a systematic bias into the cell population that composes the immune system” 
(Breznitz 2001, p. 89; italics added). Cf. Cohen: “Memory is another cognitive 
concept whose mechanism is clearer in the immune system than it is in the brain” 
(Cohen 2000, p. 186). As for biases, see those concerning the inner images in the 
cognition systems of our body according to Cohen (2000, pp. 74 and 198). 
26
 For instance, Cohen 1992a, p. 442: “To rescue a signal from noise is not 
sufficient for fitness; we have to know the context in which the signal arrives. Context 
bestows meaning. The context tells us if the gun we see [cf. ibid.: “what the system 
can see”] is likely to be a toy or a weapon, if it is theater or murder. A processed 
peptide presented in the pocket of an MHC molecule may constitute an antigenic 
epitope for a T cell, but fitness cannot be promoted without more information. … 
Appreciation of context is the beginning of wisdom” (all italics added). With my 
interpretation, the italicized psychological or cognitive terms are mentioned in this 
text not as metaphors but literally with the stipulation that they do not involve 
consciousness and that meaning is simply “the impact of information as an outcome 
of interaction” (Cohen 2000, p. 98). For more about immune information, meaning, 
and chemical language see Atlan and Cohen 1998. Note that Cohen discusses a 
“molecular dialogue” whose character “can be analyzed by exploring five attributes of 
linguistic communication: abstraction, combinatorial signal, semantics, syntax, and 
context” (Cohen 2000, p. 183; italics added). The term “abstraction” is in place here, 
Gilead - Immunology, Singularity, and Uniqueness  35
to our immune system, not in a metaphoric,27 in however useful or fruitful 
way, but literally, as long as we are aware of the fact that we are 
discussing individual organisms, each of which is unique, and not 
psychological subjects each of whom is singular. We are thus discussing 
psychological traits as biologically embodied under spatiotemporal and 
causal circumstances and as subject to the laws of physics, chemistry, and 
biology.  
 In light of such an explanation, Breznitz’s view makes much sense. 
It was a brilliant idea to demonstrate that psychological patterns are 
implemented or embodied by the immune system. I believe that, in the 
future, immunologists may gain great benefit from learning more and 
more from psychologists in understanding recognition, memory, 
commitment,28 tolerance, decision,29 defense mechanisms, guardianship, 
                                                                                                                                       
for the immune system reacts to a processed peptide serving as a representation of an 
infection agent that is not in presence (ibid.). As a cognitive system, “the immune 
system recognizes not entities but signs of entities. Just as a spoken word is both a 
physical reality and an abstraction [namely, it is a symbol], a molecule may function 
as a physical abstraction” (ibid'.). See more about the immune semantic and syntax, 
language and dialogue (ibid., pp. 184–185). In sum, Cohen believes that “the immune 
language might share strategic structures with natural language worthy of study; they 
both are concerned with generating meaning out of information” (Cohen 2000, p. 
185). Cf. Jerne 1984a. 
27
 Unlike the following, concerning the danger theory: “Those who insist on 
experimental verification miss the point of these theories, which are essentially 
metaphorical generalizations, far abstracted from the gritty but testable details of 
immunity” (Vance 2000, p. 1727). Endorsing the idea of saving possibilities, I prefer 
instead Carolyn Strange’s view as, while referring to Matzinger’s novelty, she 
reminds the reader: “Upon breaking free of old assumptions, researchers can begin to 
consider new possibilities that had been quite literally unthinkable. When dogma 
predicts that an experiment would not work, it rarely is performed” (Strange 1995, p. 
665). 
28
 Which Breznitz 2001, p. 90 mentions. 
Gilead - Immunology, Singularity, and Uniqueness  36
protection, treating and mistreating threats and danger, containing or 
holding, associating,30 responding or answering,31 education,32 dialogue 
or conversation,33 and the like, all of which have served immunologists 
quite fruitfully, not as merely metaphors, however useful and even 
indispensable. Such terms shed light on immunological phenomena. Such 
is the case because the identity of some of the biological embodiments or 
implementations taking part in our body rests inescapably on the 
psychological, on the singularity of each one of us.   
Our era is facing an imminent danger to the independence of 
psychology, which many brain scientists as well as psychologists attempt 
to reduce to the research into the functions of the brain. This most 
                                                                                                                                       
29
 Breznitz refers to “a ‘decision’ must be made whether to effect an immune 
response against them or to tolerate them. The most typical instance of the need to 
deal with what psychologists call ambivalence is in the context of an immunological 
cross-reaction. … In this respect, not unlike in the case of the psychology of conflict, 
subsequent reactions follow prior commitments” (Breznitz 2001, p. 91). It appears 
that Breznitz hesitates between his bold application of psychological terms to 
immunology and the dogmatic reluctance to do so, for there are cases in which he 
does not mark psychological terms with inverted commas (in this citation,  
ambivalence, tolerance, and commitments), whereas in other cases he uses them (in 
this citation, “decision;” and, while Clarke and Playfair mention the term “decision” 
with no inverted commas, in the citation from their paper, Breznitz, nevertheless, adds 
them in his comment to the cited term). As far as I can see, he is not consistent in this 
matter. From our viewpoint, he is consistently allowed to dispense with the inverted 
commas in each of these cases. So does Matzinger (except for “self” and “nonself”) 
by and large in her papers known to me. 
30
 Cf., for instance: “If we give the body a molecule at the time that something 
else has caused damage, the immune system will associate that new molecule with the 
(unassociated) damage, and respond to it” (Matzinger 2012, p. 311; italics added). Cf. 
“cognitive systems make associations” (Cohen 2000, p. 69).  
31
 “The first question the immune system needs to ask when faced with 
something” is “‘Do I respond or not?’ However, once you respond, there is a second 
question to ask, ‘What kind of response do I make?’ … How does the immune system 
determine what kind of response it is going to make?” (ibid., p. 313; italics added). 
32
 Matzinger 2012, p. 316.  
33
 Ibid., p. 317. 
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dangerous trend may endanger not only the existence of psychology as a 
substantive, independent science, irreducible to biology, neuroscience, 
computer science, and the like, but, even more, it may endanger biology 
as a wide-ranging and promising science and render it less abundant and 
much less promising. Psychology may save many fruitful possibilities for 
biology. Breznitz has made a pioneering step toward this aim, but so far 
this step appears to have no major continuation. It is an annoying 
symptom of the intellectual poverty of our era. Applying the 
“psychological properties of warning systems, and particularly problems 
of credibility and false alarms” to the “lawfulness discovered in 
biological warning systems” (Breznitz 2001, pp. 86–87) is a most 
promising and fruitful idea. Curiously enough, the danger immunologists, 
such as Matzinger,34 often discuss the stress of cells and tissues,35 
whereas though Breznitz is a celebrated specialist in the psychological 
research of the phenomenon of stress, he does not mention the term 
                                                
34
 The immune system selects as dangerous anything that causes cell stress or 
necrotic cell death (Matzinger 1994, pp. 1023 and 1037). Cf. Vance 2000, p. 1727. 
Note that “while it might be agreed that the immune system can sense endogenous 
signs of distress (danger), the question is whether immunology should be limited, a 
priori, to the study of these endogenous signs—especially as the molecular 
mechanisms that the immune system uses to detect ‘strangers’ is becoming 
increasingly understood” (Vence 2000, ibid.). This may make Breznitz’s 
immunoalienation even more attractive. After one year of the publication of his paper, 
Matzinger had published a very short outline of her novel theory in the very same 
journal (Matzinger 2002b)! 
35
 Cohen’s immunological theory explains how the immune system detects 
and focuses on self stress proteins and reacts to them (Cohen 2007, p. 571). Stress 
proteins “can provide the … immune system with crucial information about the local 
state (stressed or un-stressed) of the tissue” (ibid.). Breznitz’s psychological theory of 
stress may shed more light on this important aspect of the immune system. 
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“stress” or “distress” in his paper on immunoalienation. Nevertheless, he 
explicitly applies his false alarm theory (“Cry wolf”) to immunology. The 
association between Matzinger’s danger theory and the false alarm 
concerning the immune system has been suggested in the literature,36 
though not by Matzinger herself. The danger theory has an interesting 
application to artificial immune systems in computer science and 
engineering, also associated with the problem of false alarm (Dasgupta et 
al. 2010). 
If Breznitz were familiar with Matzinger’s theory, according to 
which not only the immune system takes part in protecting our body 
against danger and threats but our tissues and members also take part in 
it, the following problem would have been solved according to his own 
theory: 
 
From the viewpoint of the behavioral analysis of warning systems, 
a central weakness of the immune system stems from the fact that 
it has a virtual monopoly over the protection of the organism of 
which it is a part. This precludes corrective feedback about its 
effectiveness. The history of human warning systems abounds in 
examples in which the absence of extrinsic information (that is, 
from sources other than the warning system itself) can lead to 
major mistakes. The monopoly over information ensures the 
unchecked growth of biases. (Breznitz 2001, p. 92) 
 
 
In Matzinger’s theory, there is always room enough for extrinsic 
information, which the immune system processes. Thus, much like in 
                                                
36
 For instance, Pittman and Kubes 2013, p. 320; and Mills 2012. 
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human behavior, in cases where there is extrinsic information, the chance 
of making mistakes, especially serious ones, is minimized. Were human 
intelligence agencies as sophisticated as our immune system, they would 
undoubtedly have made fewer mistakes in processing information. No act 
of espionage—however  sophisticated—can do the job as efficiently as 
our immune system. 
 As for Breznitz’s application of the psychological distinction 
between minimal and difference thresholds of the immune system, it may 
be found useful in understanding, within the danger model, why 
monoclonal processes (whose evolvement begins with one single cell), 
such as monoclonal tumors or pregnancy, are not attacked by our immune 
system (Breznitz 2001, p. 94): because of subthreshold kinetics the 
slower rate of growth increases the chance of avoiding detection by the 
immune system.37  
The false alarm phenomenon, which Breznitz explored as a 
psychologist and to which he devoted a whole book (Breznitz 1984), is 
not valid for fully automated warning systems; it is rather valid for an 
entirely different kind of alarm systems in which decision-making or the 
evaluation of alternatives and learning from previous experiences take 
                                                
37
 Cf. Matzinger’s explanation: “An early growing tumor is a healthy tissue 
not sending alarm signals, and therefore is constantly inducing tolerance to itself” 
(Matzinger 2012, p. 316). 
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place (Breznitz 2001, p. 87).38 Such, obviously, is my psychological 
alarm system. Only in such, non-fully automated warning systems, may 
the phenomenon of false alarm based on previous experiences occur. The 
gist of the matter is that Breznitz finds evidence for the existence of the 
false alarm phenomenon not only in human behavior but also in the 
behavior of the immune system (which is well compatible with 
Matzinger’s danger model). In this system, too, the “false alarm 
phenomenon” is not a metaphor but its sense is fully literal. In other 
words, or in the terms of my psychophysical assumptions, our immune 
system implements or embodies processes of decision-making, 
evaluations of alternatives, and learning. The difference between this 
biological embodiment and that of our similar psychological processes of 
conscious decision-making, choosing and deciding between alternatives, 
and of learning is quite clear. Our immune system needs no 
consciousness to perform its tasks. While our immune system makes 
some choices and learns from previous experience, there is no 
deliberation which is subject to consciousness.39 The phenomena of 
                                                
38
 Cf. “T cells and B cells are central to the cognitive enterprise because they 
can learn from experience” (Cohen 2000, p. 107). 
39
 Yet consider the following as regards unconscious deliberation in the 
immune system: “Co-respondence can even help some of the logic of immune 
anatomy. Lymph nodes can be viewed as the courts where immune agents can gather 
to present their findings for communal co-respondence in camera, secluded from 
distractions in the tissue arena of action. Once their mutual deliberations lead to a 
joint immune decision, the agent can exit the lymph node to return to the blood for 
delivery of their verdict to the tissues. Lymph nodes are not only district offices …, 
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detection, recognition, processing information, and alienation are also 
literally valid for our immune system to the extent that none of them 
requires consciousness. This holds true for alarms, threats, signals, 
memory, inter-cell communication, stress, and distress, as these terms are 
used in immunology. 
To show that the psychological terms and the psychological traits 
that have been ascribed above to the immune system cannot be ascribed 
to inanimate systems, such as computers or any software (which are fully 
automated systems),40 we have to refer again to the issues of biological 
identity, uniqueness, and individuation to the extent that the immune 
system is concerned. No immune system of a higher individual 
multicellular organism can be duplicated or replicated, for each such a 
system is unique, bearing its single identity. Unconscious decisions, 
recognition, a sense of danger or threat, and all the other abovementioned 
psychological traits are applicable to the immune system of higher 
                                                                                                                                       
they can function as local, ad hoc, brains” (Cohen 2000, pp. 161–162). Here, too, he 
makes some analogies between the brain and the immune system. When it comes to 
cognitive and psychological terms, these analogies make much sense, for undoubtedly 
the brain embodies psychological traits and states. The difference is that while the 
brain can also embody conscious psychological traits, the immune system cannot do 
so.   
40
 Even though Cohen argues that the immune system uses a computational 
strategy to carry out its function and that reframing our view of this system in 
computational terms is worth our while, he, nevertheless, clearly emphasizes that 
there is “a fundamental difference between the computations performed by the 
immune system and those done by a computer. A Turing machine is not modified by 
either its input or its output; it simply functions according to a preset program. The 
immune system of every individual, in contrast to a Turing machine, is self-
organizing; it learns from experience; it has memory” (Cohen 2007, p. 570). Cf. 
Hershberg 2012, p. 29. 
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organisms but never to inanimate beings, none of which is unique, 
irreplicable, or unduplicable. Any hardware or software is replicable or 
duplicable; no hardware or software is unique in principle. It is the nature 
of such devices that they are duplicable or replicable. In contrast, my 
finger prints are unique and there cannot be any other person who has the 
same finger prints. My immune system is unique; nobody else can share 
it with me. This holds true also for so-called “identical” twins. 
As for the individuation function that Pardeu ascribes to any 
immune system (Pradeu 2013, pp. 90–92), including that of unicellular 
“organisms” and “superorganisms,” any biological individuality ascribed 
to such a system does not entail subjecting it literally, and not only in a 
metaphorical sense, to psychological traits or to cognitive and 
psychological terms. Only the immune system of an organism that is a 
biological embodiment of a person, namely, of a singular subject, is 
allowed to be subject non-metaphorically but rather literally to 
psychological traits and to cognitive and psychological terms.   
Psychological subjects, each of which is singular, can be thus 
embodied only as organisms that have a higher biological individuality 
and identity. When we ascribe psychological traits to inanimate beings, 
such as computers, we are dealing only with metaphors, not with the 
literal sense of these terms. Thus, we ascribe “(artificial) intelligence,” 
“memory,” “information processing,” “thinking,”  “decisions,” or 
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“intentions” to computers metaphorically only. We borrow the terms 
from the concepts pertaining to our mind and metaphorically apply them 
to human-made machines. The intelligence, memory, meaning, thinking, 
deciding, and intending in the case of these machines pertain literally 
only to the human beings who planned and produced the hardware or the 
software. Still, consciousness is not a necessary condition for applying 
these terms literally. Thus, though our immune system is not a conscious 
system, it implements and performs unconscious psychological processes, 
and we are entitled to ascribe to it not only beauty but also admirable 
wisdom. 
I have argued above that psychological subjects, who are singular 
beings, are embodied as organisms, each one of which has a unique 
identity. When it comes to our immune system, it is inevitable to 
emphasize that biological uniqueness and identity are indispensable, 
hence we cannot dispense with the self-nonself distinction. The self-
nonself distinction (in any of its variations, including Cohen’s 
immunological homunculus) is inevitable in understanding and 
explaining our immune processes. Insofar as we must apply to them the 
abovementioned cognitive or psychological terms and psychological 
traits, the distinction self-nonself should be valid for the immune system. 
Of course, the danger theory is equally indispensable, but it is not 
sufficient to justify the claim that only some biological embodiments 
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which have a biological individuality and uniqueness can be of singular, 
psychological subjects, which require the self-nonself distinction. Note 
that Matzinger, although following consistently the damage 
theory/model, does not dispense with the self-nonself distinction entirely. 
After all, the damage in question is of a multicellular individual creature 
not of a collective of whatsoever kind. There is no immune system of a 
species or a genus. The immune system protects biological individuals.41 
When it comes to human individuals the term “self” is entirely in place. 
The singularity of each mind implies private accessibility, which means 
that each person has exclusive access, first of all epistemic, to his or her 
mind (Gilead 2003, pp. 43–75; Gilead 2008; and Gilead 2011). No one 
else, whether omniscient or not, has any access to any other mind. I have 
no access to the thoughts, emotions, feelings, sensations, and volitions of 
any other person. Equally, my immune system cannot perceive and 
respond to the signals pertaining or addressed to the immune system of 
other person. Following the approach that Irun Cohen suggests, my 
immune system can defend and maintain only my body; it has no access 
                                                
41
 For a contrary example see Cohen 2000, pp. 251–252, as there are 
circumstances in which the immune system kills the individual for the benefit of the 
species. How is this compatible with Cohen’s leitmotiv that the story of the immune 
system is the “tale of cognitive individuality” and “the story of the self”? He himself 
raises the question and tries to answer it: “Evolution is supposed to work on 
individual survival …, not on group survival. How could a species have ever evolved 
an immune program to kill the individual? … Just note that the immune system is a 
contractor of apoptosis for sick cells …, and sick individual, too, when the need 
arises” (Cohen 2000, p. 252). Nevertheless, sick cells are not individuals, at least not 
in the higher or complex sense that human beings undoubtedly are. As for the issue of 
social immunity, consider also the papers mentioned in footnote 13 above. 
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to the body of any other person.42 The psychological accessibility and the 
immune accessibility are thus entirely compatible and they are, like the 
psychophysical unity as a whole, inseparable. Contrary to the view of 
Tauber and others, at least the borders of the self, physically and 
psychologically, are well defined, and at least from this respect, the 
immune self is quite clear and sound. Moreover, the private accessibility 
concerning our mind, on the one hand, and our immune system, on the 
other, is more than enough to safeguard the idea of the self in general and 
the immune self in particular.43 
 
8. Conclusions 
On the grounds of my psychophysical assumptions, the unity or 
inseparability of the self, as a psychological subject, and the unique 
immune system of each individual, the immune self, is well kept.  
                                                
42
 Only the case of the fetus is different to some extent, and the immune 
system of the mother takes part in its immunity. Yet this does not allow her access to 
the mind of the fetus as they are two distinct psychological subjects. Furthermore, 
breastfeeding shares, as does blood transfusion to some extent, some of the antibodies 
of one person with the other but all such antibodies are mobilized to the service of the 
unique immune system of the other, receiving individual. 
43
 This view may shed a surprising light on the following ideas of Pradeu 
concerning the immune system: “The immune system offers a principle of inclusion 
…, because it establishes what is rejected and what is not rejected by an organism. In 
so doing, the immune system determines which constituents stick together and thus 
are parts of one and the same organism. In addition to this exclusion-inclusion 
mechanism, the immune system is truly ‘systemic’ in the sense that … it exerts its 
activity everywhere in the organism, insuring the unity and the cohesiveness of the 
organism as a whole” (Pradeu 2013, pp. 79–80). 
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One of the lessons that this paper suggests is that immunologists 
may benefit significantly from borrowing insights and ideas suggested by 
metaphysicians, philosophers, psychologists, linguists, cognitive 
scientists, and artists, and vice versa.   
I have demonstrated above that applying psychological traits and 
cognitive or psychological terms literally to our immune system, in any of 
the different immunological studies discussed above, is perfectly 
legitimate, at least in the light of my psychophysical assumptions. 
 
9. Appendix. Immunology and Panenmentalism: Why Does Our 
Immune System Actualize Psychical and Cognitive Possibilities? 
 
Let me put my approach to the above in panenmentalist terms. 
Panenmentalism is a metaphysical theory about individual pure 
possibilities and their actualities (Gilead 1999, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2013a, and 2013b). Regardless or independent of any actual 
existence and of any spatiotemporal and causal conditions, each 
individual existent is a pure possibility. Such, for instance, is the 
existence of numbers or geometrical figures as long as they are not 
considered as actual existents, namely, actualities, or as abstractions from 
actual-physical reality. Numbers and geometrical figures are thus 
mathematical individual pure possibilities. 
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 The combination actual-physical requires some explanation. 
Panenmentalism begins its investigation in dealing with the 
psychophysical problem. It offers a novel way of dealing with this time-
honored problem—the body, as a physical entity, is the actuality of the 
psychical pure possibility that is the mind. In this way, the 
psychophysical unity and the psychophysical irreducibility (namely, the 
mind is irreducible to the body and vice versa) are both well kept. 
Furthermore, the conditions, especially the spatiotemporal and causal 
ones, to which the actual and the physical are subject, are the same. 
Hence, the only possible actualization of any pure possibility, psychical 
or otherwise, is physical. By “physical” I mean strictly physical, 
chemical, biochemical, or biological.  
 Each individual actual existent—actuality—is an actualization of 
an individual pure possibility. Such an individual pure possibility serves 
as the identity of the relevant actuality, thus it is the pure possibility-
identity of that actuality. Indeed, there is no entity without identity, yet, 
unlike Quine’s precept (Quine 1969, p. 23), the identity in discussion is 
individual pure possibility. No two individual pure possibilities can be 
identical otherwise they would have been one and not two. As exempt 
from any spatiotemporality, individual pure possibilities are inescapably 
subject to the metaphysical principle of the identity of the indiscernibles. 
Individual pure possibilities, however, can be similar unless they are 
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psychical possibilities pertaining to different psychical subjects, i.e., 
persons. Each psychical possibility is singular, namely, it cannot be 
similar to the psychical possibilities of other persons. Such is the nature 
only of psychical possibilities, which distinguishes them from all the 
other individual pure possibilities. The psychical is a singular section of 
the purely possible as a whole. Panenmentalism endorses psychical 
anomalousness, namely, the psychical is anomalous—it is not subject to 
laws—whereas the actual-physical is necessarily subject to the laws of 
nature.   
 The singularity of each person, as a psychical subject, is a central 
idea in panenmentalism (to begin with Gilead 1999 and as elaborated in 
Gilead 2003). Since the actualization of any pure possibility, singular or 
not, is subject to some similarity according to the laws of physics, 
chemistry, biochemistry, and biology, psychical singularity is actualized 
merely as physical uniqueness. For instance, each human being is a 
singular person, sharing no similarity with any other person, whereas 
each person has, for instance, a unique brain, a unique immune system, 
unique finger prints, and the like. Any finger prints share some common 
properties with the finger prints of other persons, but each person has 
unique finger prints, which pertain to him or her alone. The same holds 
for our immune system—the immune systems of all human beings share 
some similarities, yet each human being has a unique immune system that 
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cannot be shared with other human beings, even if the other human being 
is an “identical” twin. 
 Persons are systematic and coherent complexes of interconnected 
and interdependent heterogeneous parts, all sharing one and the same 
psychical reality, privately accessible. Hence, persons can be actualized 
only as higher, multicellular organisms of a special kind, capable of self-
awareness and of relating to other persons, each of whom has a unique 
immune system. Each such organism is a unique, irreplicable biological 
individual. The biological individuality mentioned and discussed in this 
paper is thus only of persons or “selves” actualized as such organisms.  
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